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MODERNIZING LAND TENURE IN MAURITANIA: 
THE ROLE OF LAW IN DEVELOPMENT 1 
By John Grayzel 
Land tenure has been identified as one of the major constraints on rural 
agricultural development in Mauritania. 2 It helps determine what gets done and 
who profits from it. In one regard, therefore, this paper looks at this situation as 
one of a number of studies on Africa which have land tenure as a theme and the 
close relationship between land tenure problems, the distribution of land use 
rights
3 
development activities and local environment realities as a specific case 
focus. 
On a more theoretical level the paper seeks to draw lessons from the 
Mauritanian experience for the greater issue of the hows, whys and wherefores of 
land concentration in Africa. In this respect, Mauritania represents a somewhat 
unique set of circumstances as a former French colony that was left in an almost 
pristine precolonial state, with vast regions of arid and semi-arid lands, but few 
concentrated areas amenable to permanent agricultural exploitation. Today, it is 
experiencing extremely rapid major national, demographic, socio-cultural, and 
economic change as a result of donor-funded activities in a few select areas. 4 One 
result of this is the existence of several relatively clear and isolable examples of 
the dynamics of ongoing, still unresolved changes in land tenure practices. 
Precisely because these changes have not yet solidified in terms of either new 
national policy, law, or fixed socio-economic relations, they are particularly 
pertinent for highlighting several important questions regarding the intermediate 
process between destruction of prior land rights and practices and the acceptance 
and location of new ones. Such questions include: How do parties position 
themselves in changing yet indefinite circumstances to try and insure they will 
lose as little as possible and gain as much as feasible? When judging the degree of 
land concentration, what besides absolute area (for example, production potential, 
nature of rights, or surety of title) should be included in the equation? And, in 
assessing the consequences of land concentration, to what extent are factors such 
as to whom, how, and why new rights are accruing, of equal or greater importance 
than the simple change in the proportion of rights holders to rights, per se? 
In addition to all the above, this paper also seeks to bring to the forefront 
of discussion three additional dimensions of land tenure, development, and land 
concentration issues often neglected. The first concerns the added complexity that 
1ih.e opinions expressed are entirely those of the author. They are provided for the purpose of scholarly 
discussion only and do not in any way represent the opinions or beliefs of U.S.AlD. itself. 
2 A good general review of the problems of land tenure in Mauritania has been made by Andrew 
Manzardo, in Land Tenure and Community Development in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. 
(University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center paper 1981). 
3See Phil O'Keefe and Ben Wisner: Land Use and Development, IAI African Environment Special 
Report S, London 1977. 
4While this paper will focus on the few dominant donor-financed interventions in agricultural produc-
tion, the three most determinant donor-financed activities for the country are probably (1) the construction and 
operation of the new and ever- expanding capital of Nouakchott, (2) the construction of one east-west and one 
north-south highway, and (3) the continual provisionment of large amounts of food aid 
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nationhood can bring to reaching a rational solution appropriate to immediate 
circumstances. This is due primarily to the need to consider the balance of 
political pressures from competing factions on both the national and local levels. 
Second is the necessity to see questions of access, use, and ownership as dimensions 
of the more fundamental question of control. Third is the relation between the 
way rights are couched and converted into modern legal concepts and the role 
this plays in the final determination as to in whom, and to what extent, control is 
vested. These three questions, as will be seen, not only plague development 
activities but can actually be engendered by them, thus making such activities a 
major determinant of the total pattern of land concentration within the 
developing state. It is their combined workings and how they manifest themselves 
in the particular situation in Mauritania that is the central focus of this paper. 
However, while the interaction of the above three factors is a major focus 
of this case study, there are two separate but related hypotheses behind the conclu-
sions drawn. The first of these is that while all of the outlined factors are 
important causal and explanatory agents, one of them in particular - the 
"legalization" of traditional rights - is the operational key in terms of applied 
policy in the final determination of who will end up with what. The second is 
that, in the case in point, the politics of nationhood has replaced environment as 
the major constraint on human freedom to determine the conceptual constructs of 
the newly evolving situation. 
Background 
A basic acquaintance with the environmental and social circumstances in 
Mauritania is a prerequisite to understanding traditional land use and holding 
patterns in the country, as well as the nature of modern attempts at agricultural 
development and their consequences. The brief outline provided is intended as 
such necessary background and not as an in-depth exploration of all aspects of the 
• • • • 1 
ex1stmg s1tuat10n. 
Mauritania encompasses the western-most part of the Sahara desert and is 
the most arid of Africa's sahel states.5 While a small area in the Guidimaka may 
receive from 400-600 mm of rain a year, most of the country receives less than 
100mm a year and most of the agricultural areas less than 300mm a year. Where 
and when it does receive sufficient rainfall for agriculture, it shares the general 
characteristics of the Sahel in that the rains are highly uneven in both time and 
space, so that yearly averages can mean little if the rains are not properly spaced 
both in terms of the growing season and specific geographical areas. 
Traditional Productive Zone Practices 
The country's agricultural production systems can be divided into three 
types corresponding to three specific ecological zones. The first is represented by 
the riverine zone that borders the Senegal River, stretching from the Atlantic 
Ocean to the Mali border. Most of the area bordering the river is predominantly 
5J.M Kowa~ and A.H Kassam, Agricultural Ecology of Savanna: A Study of West Africa (Oxford, 
1978). 
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populated by the Toucouleur, a black sub-Saharan people, who in the centuries 
preceding colonization had set up several theocratic states along its banks. 6 
There, along the river, while rainfed agriculture is practiced, the crucial 
production system is recession agriculture. The system, little appreciated or under-
stood by most Westerners, relies on the annual flood of the river to inundate low-
lying areas, called walo, where, over a period of weeks, sufficient water soaks into 
the ground so that traditional varieties of sorghum, planted after the standing 
water is gone, can grow to germination solely on the moisture stored in the soil, 
without additional rainfall or irrigation. Surrounding the flood areas of the river 
are extensive areas of non-flood land, called dieri, that are relatively highly pro-
ductive when rainfall is adequate.7 However, since approximately three out of ten 
years are de facto drought years, and of the remaining seven, three or four are 
likely to be mediocre, it is on the production of the walo, whose flooding is 
determined by the more likely rains in the far away mountains of Guinea, that the 
society's survival depends. Not surprisingly, therefore, it is the control of these 
flood lands that was most determinative of the distribution of power in the 
traditional society and around which traditional legal land tenure constructs were 
framed. 
The second zone begins on the northern border of the Toucouleur 
production system, about twenty miles to the north of the river, where the 150mm 
isohyet predominates, though large shifts in this rainfall zone are common. This 
area is traditionally the domain of nomadic Arab-Berber groups, generally referred 
to as the Bidan or Moor (Maure) tribes. These peoples were predominantly 
herders of camels, goats and sheep, as well as cattle in the more southern areas. 
However, in addition to their pastoral activities they routinely exploited various 
geographically limited and isolated resource opportunities such as fish on the 
coast, salt deposits in the north, and various scattered oases and recession 
agriculture areas in the interior. In this latter case, their recession agriculture 
followed the same agronomic principles as those practiced on the coast but the 
source of water was the occasional desert rains which, because of lack of vegeta-
tion, result in sudden desert floods that can gather appreciable cumulative 
quantities of water either in depressed areas or wadi (watercourse channels that are 
dry except after rainsi 8 
6rn the westernmost area near the mouth of the river, some Wolof and Moor groups are found and in the 
easternmost area (near Mali) the Soninke replace the Toucouleur as the predominant group. However, in both 
these areas there arc found less of the usable flood recession land (walo) that characterizes the unique 
traditional production and land tenure systems of the Toucouleur areas. 
7
Estimates of agricultural production per hectare tend to be highly speculative and in fact production 
varies tremendously from plot to plot based on rainfall, soil, and weeding. In general, estimates for sorghum 
production per hectare on walo are between 300 and 500 kilos. (cf. Rural Assessment Manpower Survey 
[RAMS Project1 Statistical Annex 11, p. 66, Islamic Republic of Mauritania / U.S.AJ.D., 1982). Estimates for 
millet production on dieri land vary from an average of 350-450 kilos to 1000 kilos (Ibid.; Abdoulay Bara Diop, 
Societe Toucouleur et Migration, !FAN #XVIII [Dakar, 1965] p. 38). 
8
Oasis agriculture also relies on the collection of large quantities of water from scattered occasional rain 
over large areas. In the case of oases, however, the principle in effect is the rapid penetration of water 
through sand that then collects in an underground depression from which water must be lifted. Charles 
Toupet, La Sedentarisation des Nomades en Mauritanie Centrale Saheliene (Paris, 1977) presents much 
interesting information on life and environment in this area 
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In the case of the Bidan survival of the production unit depended on their 
herds, which not only provided the major source of food (milk and meat), but also 
the requisite number of camels necessary for both transportation of trade goods 
(including foodstuffs) in and out of the area, and for rapid military mobility that 
permitted protection of tribal properties and the domination of weaker groups. In 
fact, labor for agriculture, fishing, and herding was generally supplied by slaves or 
tributaries. In this sense, the scarce resource was not land but control over people 
and alliances, such control being acquired through a combination of military and 
religious coercion. 9 
The third zone is found in an area on the southeastern border of 
Mauritania, Mali and Senegal. This region is called the Guidimaka and is an area 
of predominance of the Soninke (Sarakolle) peoples. The term "Guidimaka" 
traditionally refers to the entire Soninke-dominated area that extends into all three 
countries. The Soninke are the northernmost fringe of those Mande-speaking 
peoples whose agricultural complex is characterized by the extensive cultivation of 
rainfed lands and crops, especially sorghum and millet. 10 
With generally enough rainfall (600mm/yr plus) and generally more than 
enough land, the most common constraint to production is sufficient labor for 
land preparation, weeding and harvest, a problem solved only through extensive 
collaboration between extended family and community members (supplemented in 
the past with slave labor and increasingly at present with hired labor, generally 
Bambara, from Malii 11 The ability to mobilize such labor becomes the crucial 
resource and is effected largely through the controlled distribution of village and 
family lands and specifically the more fertile parcels therein. However, given the 
overall surplus of land in the region, the task is basically one of competent 
administration by extended family and village leaders, since undue alienation of 
others could result in their leaving the group and taking their labor elsewhere. 
Social Structure and Land Tenure Practices 
The Moors, Toucouleur, and Soninke all share a basic hierarchical social 
structure found throughout much of West Africa. It is characterized by a ruling 
warrior and/or religious aristocracy, followed by free people who are neither noble 
9
Sources on past traditional Bidan Mauritanian life are few. They include Francis Chassey, L'Etrier, la 
houe et le livre (Paris, 1977), and C.C Stewart and E.K. Stewart, Islam and Social Order in Mauritania 
(Oxford, !973~ 
lOMy use of the term "Mande" follows that of George Murdock, Africa (New Yor~ 1959), and is used for 
the sake of placing the Sonin.k.e in the larger West African content and contrasting their origins and cultural 
links to that of the other two groups. It is not meant as an unqualified endorsement of Murdock"s overall 
distributional scheme. As regards the Sonioke of the Guidimaka, little specific in-depth published information 
exists besides the interesting but dated work of L Saint-Pere Les Sarakolle du Guidimaka (Paris, 1925) and a 
more recent good but limited overview by P. Bradley, et al. The Guidimaka Region of Mauritania 
(London, 1977). An in-depth ethnography of Soninke in Mali by E. Pollet and G. Winters, La Societe Soninke 
(Brussels, 1971), contains much relevant but also some significantly inapplicable data for Mauritania 
1
1'be need for the Soninke to hire migrant Bambara at the same time as their own youth migrate for 
wage employment outside the region is an example of the need for the constant reintroduction and circulation 
of money within these production systems. For an in-depth understanding of the historic role of imports, 
exports, and capital among the Moors, see James Webb, "Shifting Sands: An Economic History of the 
Mauritanian Sahara 1500-1850'" (PhD. thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1983). 
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nor powerful, followed by casted peoples (such as artisans and entertainers), serf-
like tributaries or freed slaves, and finally slaves per se. The different ways this 
general framework was and remains modified and qualified by each group is to a 
significant extent both determined and determinative of rights to land and 
resources. For purposes of this paper, only the briefest and most general 
variations need be considered. 
Among the Arab-Berber Moors, the basic living, travel and production unit 
was the nomadic/pastoral encampment (frig) which could be composed of single 
family or extended family and attached groups such as slaves and artisans. Each 
family belonged to a fraction (Jakhdh) of a tribe with whom it clearly identified 
and allied itself. In contrast, the larger tribal identity (qabila) played a much less 
significant role in everyday life. 
Often attached to particularly powerful fractions and families were the 
"Haratin" - freed slaves/serfs, usually assumed to be descendants of black sub-
Saharan people from surrounding areas. The Haratin are agriculturalists and live 
in their own agricultural communities. Traditionally, they were free in the sense 
that they owned their own possessions, in contrast to slaves for whom everything 
they possess - at least in theory - belongs to their master. 
Within the context of the prevailing warrior-ruled desert society, the 
Haratin were forced to attach themselves to a protecting fraction to which they 
paid tribute in the form of a large percentage of their agricultural production. 
Inland rainfed and flood recession areas, especially those in the south nearer the 
river, were generally worked by the Haratin who paid the prevailing power what 
they had to in order to be left in peace. In contrast, more remote oasis areas were 
worked by actual slaves. Oasis land was considered the property of the fraction, in 
contrast to the date trees themselves, which were considered the property of the 
person who planted them or of his master, if the actual cultivator were a slave. In 
terms of control, in the oasis areas the Moors basically controlled both the land 
and its use, giving their slaves the minimum necessary subsistence. In the non-
oasis areas, the Moors generally only controlled the population, leaving the 
question of actual daily agricultural management of the land to the users. 
In the case of the Toucouleur, one finds a sedentary population strung out 
along two sides of a river that both provides relatively easy mobility and, as 
described above, the basis of a somewhat unique recession agriculture system. The 
valuable flood basin land, walo, was limited in terms of total available acreage and 
size of individual parcels and did not require large labor input for either land 
preparation or weeding. This resulted in the nuclear family sufficing as the basic 
labor group for work on small scattered parcels, often on both sides of the river. 
The generalized hierarchical structure of West Africa expressed itself in 
the form of an Islamic religious elite exacting tribute as a percentage of produc-
tion tax. Generally this was 10 percent of production, called the assakale. This 
right to a percentage could not, however, be defined as absolute ownership. The 
person owning the land in terms of the right of distribution for use was called the 
dyom /eydi, or "master of the bush." The dyom /eydi was usually a powerful member 
of a prominent clan in the area. People of such status collected fees that included 
a "yearly entry fee" (n'dioli), and a payment to compensate the descendants of the 
dyom_/eydi for loss of use (tiotigu). This last fee is evidence of the generally held 
belief that land should, but need not necessarily, be kept within the family and 
clan. However, even the right to these payments and initial distribution was not 
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necessarily the same as a right of control or usage. This belonged to the dyom 
dyengol or "master of the fire," meaning the first person to clear the land for use. 
In fact he actually controlled the land and, if he chose not to use it, he could lease 
it to another, generally for a specific number of good flood years or a share of the 
crops. The lessee would then be responsible for paying both the dyom dyengol and 
the dyom leydi.U In terms of control, therefore, it was usually the "master of the 
bush" who determined who would farm, while it was the actual cultivator who 
decided how to farm it. 
Among the Soninke, yet a third, quite different variant existed, also closely 
aligned to environmental realities. In contrast to both the Toucouleur situation, 
dominated by a scarcity of indispensable flood land that engendered a situation of 
buying of land rights, and the Moorish situation that was dominated by the 
"buying" of protection, the Soninke need for labor and the relative abundance of 
land, though of differing qualities, resulted in a converse situation - namely, the 
use of land rights to purchase allegiance, affiliation, and cooperation. 
According to the predominant Soninke practice, usufruct to land was 
parceled out both as reward and raison d'etre of group membership. The parceling 
began historically by two competing clans who dominated the area. Distribution 
was to founding families of villages, their kin, or allies. From that point on, it 
remained the prerogative of the village chief to distribute it to families with whom 
the land remained as long as they stayed attached to the community. Were they to 
leave, usufruct reverted. to the village chief for redistribution. Within the family 
the land remained under the authority of the extended family head, with the 
majority of the land farmed in common except for small parcels distributed to 
individual family members (and slaves) 13 for their own "side" use. Thus, it was the 
head of family that controlled most of the land in terms of both ongoing distri-
bution and daily management. If the extended family split, the land was divided 
among the heads of the new units. 
Changing Circumstances: 
Colonialism, Independence, and Development 
France asserted her sovereignty over Mauritania during the colonial era 
because the land lay between Morocco and Senegal, which were her major 
concerns. For a significant time a good deal of the area in the north was 
considered a protectorate rather than a colony. The aim was pacification, not 
12
Tue situation as to any particular piece of land could be quite complex. Sometimes the religious 
leader was also the "master of the fire." Additional groups with special privileges existed such as the Sebe 
(ancients rulers and warriors). The purpose here is not to unravel all these relations but to give a feel for the 
ability of the traditional system to handle complex issues. Specific accounts of practices often differ in some 
particulars at the same time as relying upon each other and common third party sources. The account I 
provide is basically gleaned from my own research. Other accounts include JL Boutillier, et al., La Moyenne 
Vallee du Senegal (Paris, 1982) and the RAMS reports by Dr. Mona Fikry, Social Change and Social 
Organization of Agricultural Production A.S. 8-2 and Sociological Profiles: Black Africans A.S. 7-1. 
13
consistent with their need for labor, ,the Soninke had the largest proportion of slaves of the three 
groups under study. While there were (and continue to be) many levels of discrimination against those of 
slave status among the Soninke, consistent with the Soninke stress on group unity, slaves were relatively far 
more integrated into the community and family among them than among the Moois. For example, I witnessed 
a situation where all the adult males of a free family had died and an older male slave was acting as de facto 
head of an extended family, something inconceivable among either the Moors or Toucouleur. 
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development. Except for few military outposts, the country was left to itself, its 
colonial capital actually situated across the river at Saint Louis, Senegal. At the 
time of independence in the 1960s, there was still not a single paved road, 
secondary school, or hospital in the entire country. 
The overall effect of the colonial era was largely to freeze and reinforce 
the existing social structure. The French formalized existing claims through 
administrative recognition of fraction or clan areas and leadership, while 
removinf.l from the system the mobility that was formally provided by armed 
conflict. 
This situation did not dramatically change after independence when the 
new government had to concern itself primarily with establishing the fundamental 
framework of a modern nation- state, beginning with the creation of an urban 
capital and an elementary administrative structure. From the inception of 
nationhood and the introduction of concomitant administrative practices, such as 
the establishment of a national party (the PPM), the supposed replacement of 
traditional tribal authorities by modern assembly representatives (in fact just a 
conversion of roles) and the encouragement of sedentarization, some new direction 
to socio-economic change in Mauritania was, of course, engendered. However, in 
reality much of this early charge was cosmetic, as demonstrated by the rapid 
disappearance of the PPM with the overthrow of President Ould Daddah in 1978, 
the reappearance and recognition of traditional tribal authorities with the 
abolition of the national assembly and the abandonment of quickly constructed 
new "permanent" settlements now found scattered throughout the country. 
The conflict between ideal and real was reflected in the RIM (Republique 
Islamique de Mauritanie) law pertaining to land ownership, No. 60-139 of August, 
1960. This stated that all vacant and unowned land belongs to the state (article 1), 
but also recognized traditional claims to land (article 4) and that such claims could 
be group as well as individual in nature (article 9). Given the fluidity of the claims 
of nomadic groups and the extent of their movements, together with the fact that 
most land in Mauritania is vacant at any one time, most land can be claimed by 
some group based on some repetitive occasional use. The ambiguity inherent in 
the law in question was probably not due to poor draftsmanship but was rather in 
response to a combination of political and social realities, indecision and a cultural 
14
rt should be noted that most traditional "armed conflict" was relatively mild The generally accepted 
rule of raiding as to leave a raided group with minimally sufficient animals and goods to survive. One practice 
was to take all of a group's herds. Then the other group's leader would come requesting the return of some of 
the animals which, when provided, became a ceremonial recognition of the superior authority, at least 
momentarily, of the raiding group. Saint-Exupery gives a dramatic feel for the realities of this period in his 
book Wind, Sand and Stars, where he describes his experiences as a mail pilot between France and St Louis, 
Senegal Noting the pilot's dependence on the good will of the Moors for help in cases of emergency landings 
in the desert, he relates the personal experience on one such occasion of being approached by a slave asking his 
assistance to escape. Unable to intervene in this fashion but feeling morally compelled to assist, he ended up, 
over a period of a year, negotiating for the purchase of the slave, whom he then flew to freedom. A Saint 
Exupery, Wind, Sand and Stars, (New York, 1967), pp 89-128. 
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modus operandi of maintammg open situations, susceptible to opportunistic ma-
nipulation. As a result, a de facto continuation of the traditional systems was 
tolerated if not encouraged. 15 
Dramatic change really began in Mauritania in the 1970s with the 
beginning of the prolonged, repetitive drought that has plagued the Sahel to this 
date. Marginal agricultural activity became progressively worthless. At the same 
time, the dynamics of nationhood, especially new opportunities for escape, work, 
and investment in the new capital of Nouakchott, resulted in significant 
displacement of rural labor and capital out of agriculture. Under such 
circumstances, little attention was paid to asserting rights to agricultural land. In 
some cases dependent peoples left their traditional settings. In other cases, former 
elites purposely severed the bonds between themselves and dependent groups to be 
relieved of their obligations to assure them the minimal wherewithall to live, 
which now outweighed any surplus value that could be extracted from their 
production. This situation continues to this day in many areas. However, in other 
areas a dramatic change has occurred, almost exclusively propelled by donor-
financed development activities. 
As regards development, Mauritania is not a country that has been 
saturated by donor activities. Relatively speaking, however, donor-financed 
development dominates the scene. The country's few paved road and hospitals, as 
well as most of its urban and rural infrastructure, are donor-financed. However, to 
attribute causality to donor activities is not to deny the Mauritanian element in 
the equation. In fact, in the area of agricultural development, the Mauritanian 
governmental elite, through governmental or parastatal organizations, 16 has main-
tained a preponderance of ultimate decision-making power, though in fact it is 
surrogate expatriate managers who make many of the daily decisions. 
The particular area of interest for this paper concerns development 
activities in those areas traditionally devoted to the recession agriculture already 
discussed - along the river and in wadi or depression areas in the interior. Such 
development activities have four forms: 
1) Large-scale irrigation schemes along the river 
These are projects where a modern infrastructure of dikes, canals, and 
pumping stations has been built by the Mauritania parastatal SONADER. Because 
of its proximity to the river, the land chosen for such schemes is mostly walo land 
over which the assorted traditional Toucouleur property rights applied. In 
executing such projects, the government, through SONADER, exercised its right 
of eminent domain and informed people that it was going to establish an irrigated 
15 
An extreme example of this modus operandi is seen in an incident related to me by one highly 
reliable informant who claimed to have seen, shortly after independence, a communication sent by President 
Ould Daddah the country's first, and then only French-trained lawyer, to his regional governors clarifying for 
them that slavery was no longer to be legally recognized in Mauritania The communication was stamped 
"Confidential." 
16
Parastatals are organizations created by government which, though under the tutelage of some 
government ministry (in this case the Ministry of Agriculture) operate as if they were independent private 
organizations. The major advantage of such a system is supposedly in the nature of daily operations that 
follow business practices and, especially, in the recruitment of personnel who sign contracts and can be paid 
according to private sector salary scales. 
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perimeter. "Compensation" in the form of a modest amount of grain, supposedly to 
replace lost production, was given to the owners (dyom dyengol). When the land 
was divided up, priority in the distribution of a percentage of the parcels was 
made to these owners and other claimants, including powerful figures who were 
traditional overlords, the dyom leydi. To these were added some outsiders. 
Theoretically, each individual got the same size parcel, but in fact land is found 
registered in the name of several family members and plot size does vary, often 
according to social and former land-holding status. 
In terms of investment, the perimeter was built and the pumps were 
installed and maintained by SON ADER, with government funds obtained largely 
from donor grants. SONADER technicians generally determine what is to be 
planted and when, a situation that has resulted in an emphasis on rice cultivation, 
though many farmers would rather plant sorghum and corn.17 Likewise 
SONADER purchases the crop at prices it sets (below market) and charges the 
farmers a fee at the end of each season for inputs such as fertilizer and pump fuel. 
2) Small-scale irrigation perimeters along the river 
These are found in several areas, but especially along the far eastern 
portion of the river in the Guidimaka. There the topography differs from the 
more western areas in having less recession land (walo). As a result, high land 
bordering the river ( called fonde) is more important. In general, such land is not 
amenable to large perimeters and relatively small amounts are cleared: 50-100 
hectares. Canals are dug by hand by the people involved, though in some cases the 
initial leveling is done by a bulldozer owned by SONADER. SONADER also 
supplies the basic inputs such as pumps, fertilizer, seed (rice) and technical advice 
in the form of occasional visits (in contrast to daily supervision on large 
perimeters). As with large perimeters, SONADER charges the farmers for inputs 
made during the growing season. The particular choice of land is made through 
mutual agreement between the technicians and the community leaders and the 
distribution of parcels is decided by the community itself. 
3) Small-scale water retention dams in the interior in depression areas and 
along small wadi 
These are generally earthen structures with a metal, wood, or concrete gate 
to block and release water at the exit point of the depression. The water 
contained by them generally covers from 50 to 200 hectares of land. Government 
(and some donor) funds and services are provided to build the initial structure with 
the community members providing labor of their own (if Haratin) or a monetary 
contribution to hire someone to replace them (if Bidan). Once built the entire 
management and maintenance of the structure and flooded land is left to the 
community. The distribution of land is also the responsibility of the community, 
one standard being to allot shares based on each individual's contribution in time 
or money to construction. 
17 
Such expressed farmer preference for sorghum and corn rather than rice is attributable to a combina-
tion of factors including perceived lower costs, less rigid and disciplined labor needs and a desire to avoid the 
requirement of marketing rice through the parastatal at a fixed, below-market price. 
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4) Large-scale dams on large wadi 
On the Gorgo! Noir, a major drainage outlet from central Mauritania into 
the Senegal River, at an area known as Fom Guelta, SONADER has built, with 
donor funding, a large dam that is slated eventually to provide water for thousands 
of hectares of irrigated agriculture. The actual project, with the extensive 
infrastructure planned, will take years to build, at an estimated cost of from $20,000 
to $50,000 a hectare. The area in question was previously farmed by assorted 
communities of Haratin, freed slaves and former slaves still traditionally attached 
to the communities of their P,ast masters. 18 How to divide up the land was a 
subject of intense study in 1985.19 
Conflicts and Consequences 
All of the above projects were designed and implemented on the 
assumption that they would greatly increase the productivity of the land and 
people involved. In some circumstances this has already occurred; in others it has 
not. However, in all cases the prospect that this would occur gave the land in 
question immediate new value. This resulted in producing varieties of reactive 
behavior that engendered some severe setbacks to the successful implementation 
of the projects and the land reorganizations planned around them. 
1) The Irrigated Perimeter at Kaedi (zone 1) 
Since its inception the perimeter has suffered from severe constraints on 
production. Many plots are left barely planted or so poorly cared for that 
production is far below expectation. Much of this is ascribed by project personnel 
to a purposeful intent not to cooperate and a de facto boycott by former land 
owners, both dyom leydi and dyon djengol. To some extent this is probably true. 
Also true, however, is that cultivation of the perimeters involves calculated trade-
offs between conflicting demands for labor, time and monetary investments in 
both dryland and remaining traditional flood recession agriculture, as well as 
alternative wage labor. The one certain fact is that the project has expropriated 
rights on all levels: from the clans that had limited control of the alienation of 
the land to outsiders, from the dyom leydis who had primary distribution rights, and 
from the dyom djengols and actual cultivators who had seasonal management 
control. 
It is mainly on the level of on-going control of management that the 
"battle" is occurring. In fact, in looking over past Toucouleur practices, it becomes 
evident that what users always obtained and wanted was control over the land in 
terms of its precise application to their needs. "Ownership" either in the abstract 
18
The situation is given an added dimension of complexity since the major community of Mbout, a 
former colonial administrative area, was one of the few settlements during colonial time where slaves could 
obtain refuge under French protection. Such people socially are not considered by Moor society as "freed," 
since to be "freed" means to be released by one's owner, not to have escaped 
19
Most of the information for this article was collected in the years 1979-1983 while I was working in 
Mauritania One practical outcome of those studies was the design of an AID-funded project for the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center to conduct a training/research program to create a new cadre of land 
tenure specialists in the Ministries of Agriculture or Planning. These trainees have since been asked to focus 
specifically on the problems at Fom Guelta, which, it is hoped, will result in a more profound treatment of the 
situation. 
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sense of land actually belonging to them or having an ultimate right to alienate it, 
was relatively insignificant. What users wanted, and still want, is to be able to 
integrate their use of this land to their entire portfolio of economic activities. 
This, however, is precisely contrary to the arrangements sought by the parastatal. 
SONADER wishes to redistribute ownership to a larger number of actual users, 
thereby holding them ultimately responsible for the land and assorted costs and 
risks while denying them the right to determine it seasonal use. The parastatal's 
management/technical cadre's ultimate concern is not only to have a fairly 
consistent supply of labor, but one that it can train and retain in more complex 
agriculture practices. This is why they favor the idea of ownership or lifetime 
tenancy for cultivators. In this sense the fight is not so much over land as over 
technology, and who will determine which technology is used and how.20 
2) The Case of Small Recession Dams (zone 2) 
The situation with the small interior dams is quite different. Here the 
technology is simple. The main need for assistance is in the initial financing of 
construction or loan of a bulldozer, since the construction technology is less a case 
of engineering skill than one of possessing adequate equipment. Cultivation 
techniques remain the same as before. The major changes are in having the 
assurance of additional, though very limited, flood land, and reduced seasonal need 
for labor in reconstruction of the dam. 
In fact, the government has little interest in getting directly involved in the 
production of these areas. Assistance is provided largely as a political act of ser-
vice to the community. The problem that arises involves the question of who 
constitutes that community. The land is inevitably registered administratively, 
from the time of colonization, in the name of a particular fraction. The Haratin 
who have actually been cultivating in the area assert that the land is theirs in 
either the direct sense of ownership or usufruct rights. They support this by 
claiming they are the Haratin "members" of the fraction whose Bidan elite used to 
control the area in the sense of authority and tribute. The Bidan members of the 
fraction, many of whom are former pastoralists now sedentarizing and therefore 
in search of land for use, residence, or income, claim that it belongs to them. 
Their argument is that the Haratin were tributaries rather than members of the 
fraction, and that Haratin only cultivated land by permission of the possessing 
fraction. In some areas various modi operandi have been worked out, but in many 
the outcome has been significant conflict, often resulting in the suspension of 
everyone's right or ability to use the area. 
3) Small River Perimeters in the Guidimake (zone 3) 
Production on these has been somewhat disappointing, but the majority of 
problems concern complaints by the users as to the quality and costs of the 
technical services provided. Among themselves little apparent conflict exists 
between users or over rights to land. This is understandable, as a relatively small 
20
The presumption that owner-operators are probably more efficient producers than tenants is found in 
much of the present-day literature. (For example, "The conversion of tenants into owner operators generally 
leads to a more efficient and more equitable form of production organization than tenancy," World Bank Land 
Reform Sector Policy Paper, May 1975, p. 34) Other, less noble or seemingly value-free motives for favoring 
owner-operators over sharecropping or direct employment by the controlling agency, such as the desire to pass 
off costs, are not generally expressed in the literature but can be extrapolated from common practice. 
12 
quantity of land is involved in terms of actual size and percentage of the ongoing 
production system (both for the Soninke themselves and for the parastatal). The 
land in question, whether fonde (high river bank land) or even small areas of walo, 
is not the crucial element in the production system, and the applicable annual 
distribution of rights and cooperative labor is a variant of the established Soninke 
system for land distribution. 
4) Large Interior Irrigation Dams (zone 2) 
The case of the large new dam on the Gorgo! Nair represents a potential 
example of the worst of all possible worlds. There is no organized single 
community; much of the area is claimed by Bidan fractions, the actual cultivators 
are mainly Haratin and former slaves, and the investment is so great and the area 
so extensive that the government will at some point find itself committed to 
getting it to work, meaning probably that SONADER will have to assume the 
major responsibility for its ongoing management. Exactly how things will turn 
out is not clear, but significant problems are anticipated by all parties concerned. 
Possible Solutions: 
The differences regarding land tenure practices and policies between the 
government and local communities, between and within communities themselves, 
and between various traditional modern, urban, and rural populations at the time 
most of the data for this paper was collected (1983) were often described by both 
government officials and donors as intractable. The then-prevailing system might 
best be described as mixture of "state (prevailing power) arbitraryism" and 
"personal opportunism." Since this has been the prevailing reality of most of 
Mauritania from time immemorial, at least the Moorish population felt quite at 
home with it, despite occasional protestations. Probably more than anything else, 
those pushing for action in the form of "land reform" were donor and donor 
project representatives and technicians, who met resistance, however, from system 
inertia and political realities. 
Various suggestions have periodically been made for addressing land tenure 
problems in Mauritania. These largely parallel those offered throughout the 
developing world, each with its own constituencies, beneficiaries, adversaries, and 
drawbacks: 
1) Recognizing the rights of present and traditional holders 
This suggestion finds its supporters in those now in clear possession of land 
or in positions of influence to put themselves in that situation, such as the Bidan 
elites in the interior and Toucouleur elites along the river. That it should be 
favored by the haves is self-evident. What is crucial to understand is that the 
operative definition of rights holders is quite superficial and almost always refers 
to the idea of vesting complete ownership or usufruct rights in the existing 
traditional party with dominant rights, while totally ignoring the possible 
multiplicity of collateral rights held by other parties, such as access, selective 
exploitation, grazing rights or passage. Given the complex nature of land use in 
most of African, the existence of such collateral rights is almost always the case. 
In this sense, whether the party arguing for recognition of traditional rights to 
complete control of the land is a rich leader or a poor farmer, they are almost 
always asking for the divestiture of the collateral rights of others. 
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Opposition to such a policy naturally comes from have-nots, such as former 
slaves and tributaries and social reformers, but also, most importantly, often from 
technical cadre in general, and, in the case of donor projects, from large project 
administration and donor policy-making personnel. 
2) Giving land rights to a parcel of land to those who are actually making. 
or are willing to make, productive use of it 
The most prevalent suggestion under this rubric is generally to tie land 
rights to possession and use. Those who put the land to use by working it, or 
building on it, should be given the rights to it, thereby doing away with both more 
expansive and more limited claims of other individuals or groups. As noted above, 
major support for this approach is found among the technical cadre and 
development personnel who see the private owner/producer as a desirable 
instrument for introducing new techniques. Their belief is that the most 
productive individuals are those who work for themselves. They see such a 
resolution as in harmony with the need to provide sustained training to the 
worker/producer, and the belief that necessary long-term investment of labor and 
resources by a producer requires a long-term interest in the land. 
The last two reasons, however, are two-edged swords. They imply that the 
producers must undergo substantial new learning and make substantial new 
investments of time, labor, and money before the new technologies will pay off. 
This requires a leap of faith that many producers lack. As a result, the very 
exercise of the discretion that usually accompanies private ownership, such as was 
the essence of the rights held by the traditional Toucouleur "master of the bush" is 
seen as a major hindrance to change. The result is that the new rights that are 
often created do not include fundamental control over determining land use, which 
was what traditional rights were largely about. Instead, the new rights guarantee 
access to use only as the prevailing sovereign power, the state or its parastatal 
surrogate, decrees appropriate. 
3) Vesting ownership of productive land in the State, and either g1vmg 
private usufruct rights to those able to put it into immediate production. or 
establishing a non-private production system on it. such as a cooperative or state 
operation 
This formula, ideologically so popular for the first years of development in 
many Third World countries is, in its more radical forms, increasingly out of favor 
because of the disastrous economic results experienced. In Mauritania local 
cooperatives are in reality usually marketing/purchasing associations of private 
individuals assembled under a new title that facilitates interaction with the state 
and its representatives. However, a large gray area exists in a new form of 
government redistribution of rights that links ownership of land parcels to 
cooperation with a centrally determined utilization and authority. Here producers 
have a mixed bag of shared and individual responsibilities for cost and risks, but 
generally only individual claims to benefits. Both the state and donors like to 
term such situations as "cooperatives," but what seems to distinguish them above all 
else is the lack of cooperation that exists, especially between officialdom and the 
producers. 
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4) Community ownership 
Under the community ownership schemata, the land belongs to the 
community and it is the community, through its representatives, which determines 
use and internal distribution. In many ways this is the Soninke production system 
universalized. As an in-depth look at the Soninke system would reveal, though 
often quite effective, it is not necessarily egalitarian or equitable. It has been 
repeatedly been proposed, however, by numerous researchers and development 
consultants, who usually share the distinction of having no permanent work rela-
tion with either the government or parastatal. The problem is that the 
government and parastatals wish to use community organization and leadership as 
an entry point for their own agenda and not as the springboard for rejection of 
their plans, or new demands on them, which is what real community ownership 
could lead to. 
As can be seen, all possibilities are imperfect, as seems inherent in human 
situations. However, all are possible, as shown by the fact that all can be found 
operating to some degree. The fact that as of 1983 none could become the 
accepted standard or practice was not because of their imperfections but because 
within the national pluralistic context no single proposal could gain national 
consensus because no single solution could be imposed without seeming to favor 
one constituency so much as to raise powerful opposition from another. 
Basically, the need for donor assistance and the pressures of donor policy 
have made purposeful maintenance of the traditional "feudalistic" system unaccept-
able. This is accompanied by a rejection of these traditional systems by technical 
cadre who see the most desirable relation as that of state/project technician to 
farmer/producer, with the technician the dominant party. Partially this is tied to 
the type of technology to be introduced, partially to a belief that the traditional 
system is inefficient, and partially because modern educated technicians tend to 
have little sympathy for the role of traditional absentee owners, especially those 
whose political power could challenge their own authority. 
Given the limited number of opportunities for substantial investment in 
modern agriculture in Mauritania, the pressure to impose a modern donor-financed 
large-scale irrigation system along the Senegal River is almost irresistible. Since 
this did not seemingly interfere with the Moor power base, such an imposition on 
a limited number of minority Toucouleur was already possible at Kaedi. This was 
made even easier by the fact that many of these people had land on both sides of 
the river and that Senegal had effected a land reform expropriating the parcels of 
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the large traditional owners several years before. 21 At the same time, the interest 
of the Moors in maintaining their own rights as overlords blocked pressures to 
make such a redistribution into national policy. 
Conversely, however, the expropriation of the rights of the Toucouleur 
made it impossible to consider formalizing the traditional rights of the Bidan in a 
new legal structure. While the Toucouleur may not have been powerful enough to 
resist modernization of their rights, the justification of modernization would be 
difficult to maintain if feudal rights in Moor-dominated areas were newly affirmed 
at the same time. The result was the selective application of new standards only as 
economically necessary and politically possible. Within this framework it is the 
Soninke, at least for the moment, who seem best able to maintain their status quo, 
doing so in the guise of cooperative community ventures. Their traditional system 
is sufficiently similar on an operational basis to the desires of the 
technical/developmental cadre as to conform to them without major changes in 
established rights. Their deeper social structure is sufficiently authoritarian and 
hierarchical as to see its advantage in continuation of the old ways and to contain 
any pressures for support of a real land reform. 22 The ability of the Soninke to 
maintain such an equilibrium between the other disputing parties in the country is 
related to another adaptation of their traditional structure to modern national life. 
The two original settling clans have translated their ongoing competition into tak-
ing opposite sides from each other in national politics. As a result one group is 
generally "in" with the present powers, while the other will be "in" if and when 
power shifts. 
The end result is the morass of gray area practices that pits central power 
against community interests against private ambition in what I have termed "state 
arbitraryism vs. individual opportunism." 
A Change of Heart? 
In 1983, however, after years of apparent indecision, a proclamation was 
made, vesting land rights in those who put the land into productive use. Ordinance 
21
Senegal Law No. 6446 of June 17, 1964, article 15, states that "those persons personally occupying and 
exploiting the lands of the National domain at the effective date of the present law will continue to so occupy 
and exploit them." The intent of the law was to create a usufruct in the land. Thus, Article 19, Chapter IV of 
the Decree of Application 64JS13 states that "The conferring [of the land] is personally to the individual or 
group in question. It cannot be made the object of any transactions. It is decreed for an indeterminate 
duration. It confers to the benefiting party a right of usage of the land in question." 
In reality, the result was a transfer of rights to a lower level Over time many new rights-holders have 
entered into arrangements with others ceding use of their parcels under the same conditions which they once 
held them under the tutelage of the previous traditional rights holders. (See John Orayzel, "Cultural 
Background and Social Soundness Analysis for Proposed Irrigation Project at Matam, Senegal," 
U.s.Al.DJBechtel Corporation, 1976). 
22 
A dramatic example of this was a situation in France where problems arose when young men of slave 
status decided that the cleanup work in their migrant worker dormitory should be shared by all the men who 
were both co-workers and from the same village. The dispute was resolved when a group of the elder village 
leadership took a plane to France and explained that of course those of slave status were free in the sense that 
they could go where they wished, but that their parents had obtained and still farmed land in the village 
because they were slaves of a family. If they lost this status, they would also have to give up the land 
obtained because of it (personal communication). 
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83.127 of June 5, 1983, states that "land belongs to the nation and every Mauritanian, 
without discrimination of any kind, can, in conformity with the law, own land 
[Article I]; that the state recognizes and guarantees private property ... [Article 2]; 
and that the traditional land tenure system is abolished [ Article 3]." 23 
Several questions immediately arise. Is the policy to be taken seriously in 
light of the past history of ineffective promulgations of new legal standards (as 
well as the subsequent overthrow of the governments making them)? 24 Will it 
really be applied nationally or only selectively in continuation of the overriding 
modus operandi of "state arbitraryism''? Can it even be applied, since Articles 2, 11, 
and 13 of the law specifically state that the new law will be in conformity with the 
Shari'a, which sets up an inherent conflict between traditional rights under Islamic 
law and those under this new civil legislation? Is it not largely an attempt to 
satisfy donor demands and, as such, will it at best become a new member of the 
pluralistic system in de facto operation? 
Only time will tell how this new policy will really operate. I suspect that 
to some extent all the above factors are at work and that the arrival of the crisis 
of land distribution at the new Fom Guelta recession dam on the Gorgo! Noir will 
help bring these factors to a head. Any resolution will still take years, with much 
interim inconsistency in application. However, I also believe that an additional 
factor has been crucial to breaking the previous paralysis for any such official 
declaration at all and will be a major determinant of how this policy will alter the 
concentration of land ownership in Mauritania over time. In this sense, I am 
consciously making a leap from analysis to prediction. 25 
The qualitative change that has occurred is due to a combination of the 
continuing drought in the Sahel and the actual beginning of the construction of a 
long-awaited series of dams on the Senegal River. Basically the Moors 
(specifically the desert Bidans) have psychologically begun to give up on their own 
traditional territory. Their long-evinced tenacity in holding on to this heritage can 
only be termed courageous, if reactionary. They insisted on the construction of 
the country's only paved east-west link, passing through the country's interior, over 
2000 kilometers of often shifting dunes, rather than along the river, precisely be-
cause, if it did not, they feared the total desertion of the interior regions. 26 
Similarly they have resisted much actual collaboration on river development plans 
because unofficially they saw it as a social/cultural/ economic and eventually 
political invasion of their region by the sub-Saharan agricultural way of life. I 
have actually heard Moors express the hope that the desert would bloom, rather 
23
Translation done and provided by Dr. Thomas Part, Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, 
Madison. 
24
Tue most extreme example of this has been the proclamations ending slavery, which have been made 
at least four times since independence, the last three because of pressures to do so in light of the lack of 
adequate progress in implementing the previous proclamations. The -government making the new land policy 
proclamation was overthrown in 1985, but officially the policy is still in effect 
25
Tbe process will, I suspect, take at least ten to twenty years, with much national vacillation in policy 
enforcement along the way. The first indications will be the access of H aratin cultivators to traditional 
Toucouleur lands, followed by poor Moors, and then alienation of parcels to richer parties. 
26
This project was financed largely through Arab and French assistance, while various other donors, in-
cluding the World Bank and AID., refused to contribute because of the lack of economic justification. 
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than that things should bloom in the desert, as they see desert aridity as a most 
effective barrier to non-Moor penetration. 
The fact is, however, that they have now begun to resign themselves to an 
apparent new reality. Years of loss of livestock by the majority of herders, 
massive rural exodus to the capital, sedentarization, and, concomitantly, an 
escalating rise in urban land values, have begun to convince them that they must 
move south or perish. In terms of land tenure policy, both Bidan and Haratin are 
beginning to be less concerned with maintaining their traditional footholds than 
with establishing new ones. To do this along the river requires a "de-
communitarianization" of land and a new individualistic distribution of land 
parcels. This must be accompanied by sufficient privatization of rights so that 
these can be distributed to outsiders and, subsequently, be bought, sold, or leased 
from rights-holders and (especially important for the Bidan) then exploited through 
paid labor. 
The eventual results of such a policy will be, I believe, the evolution of a 
significant concentration of land rights in the south (with the possible exception 
of traditionally Soninke areas) in the hands of Moors, beginning with Haratin 
cultivators, but eventually including Bidan investors who were never before present 
in the river agricultural production system. The Moors will not overwhelm the 
situation, but will become an important presence in it. Also present will be non-
Bidan investors, including traditional Toucouleur elites, religious leaders, and urban 
bureaucrats. 27 
A significant number of traditional Toucouleur and Haratin small-holders 
will always be present. In this sense, the system will be self-limiting because of the 
need of non-farming rights-holders for paid labor. The only way to guarantee 
such a labor force is to provide them with land sufficient to entice them to stay 
but inadequate to meet their full needs for case. The situation actually sounds 
more diabolical than it is. The reality of production in such marginal areas as 
Mauritania is that there is almost always a need for outside capital to pay for 
needed imports of food, cloth, rare woods and metals and so on. Since to obtain 
such goods and capital requires prolonged absences for both work and trade dur-
ing agriculturally productive periods, some alliance and exchange is needed 
between local producer/laborers and absentee capitalists. 28 
Legalization and the Deprivation of Rights 
The propensity of established social systems to reproduce themselves under 
the guise of modernity should not shock anyone who has studied the problem in 
any depth. If there is anything that is problematic, it is not that there will be 
displacements but exactly who will be displaced and at what price. It is this last 
problem that raises new questions of equity and, perhaps, some specific new 
possibilities for influencing the process. 
Regardless of who ultimately does win out, the fundamental nature of the 
operative process, which is driven by emergent nationhood and integration into a 
modern worldwide economic and political system, will remain the same. In trying 
27 Loss of land rights by poor to richer investors as a result of the destruction of community ownership is 
a well known phenomenon. See Joel Migdal, Peasants, Politics and Revolution (Princeton, 1977), 134-138. 
28See footnote 11, above. 
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to understand this process, the first thing to point out is the shared characteristics 
both of the various noted solutions that have been proposed and the evolving 
circumstances themselves. These may be outlined as follows: 
1) Everyone but the immediate traditional rights-holders either advocates 
or tacitly supports the establishment of a new system. The past and present 
system is seen as not able to continue and evolve as is. 
2) The final determination of what the new system will be is to be made 
by a chosen group and not the rights-holders or recipients themselves. This chosen 
group, whether indigenous or foreign, whether government officials or technical 
experts, is basically going to impose their decision on the majority (presumedly for 
their own or the national good). 
3) The new system will be effected and embodied in a modern legal 
structure adaptive to the modern (especially the urban) sector. 
4) In designing the new system, the prior existence of extensive traditional 
rights is recognized, but the new system itself will involve only a very selective in-
corporation or conversion of such rights into the new order. 
5) Regardless of which variation of incorporating traditional rights is 
chosen, the basic process will be one of the gross simplification, for the sake of 
national application, of very complex, locally adaptive existing situations. 
6) The simplification of existing rights will increasingly take the form of 
the reduction of the vast gamut of present practices into a handful of more 
conceptually constricted categories such as private ownership and usufruct. 
In all, a major political exercise is in process which is reputedly justified as 
a response to an overwhelming need to vest rights in appropriate productive 
parties. As a final result to this process, more individuals may or may not end up 
with some new entitlements to land use than was previously the case. However, in 
reality the very means being used to establish such new rights is simultaneously 
functioning as a de facto mechanism for the expropriation of a much wider range 
of presently vested interests than any that will be conveyed or created. As such, it 
is open to condemnation on the grounds of equity alone. However, equity aside, 
such expropriation can be criticized for creating a situation unacceptable to the 
majority of the people, for its poor adaptation to local environmental realities, for 
its disruption of present production systems and paralysis of new ones, for its 
excessive simplicity in terms of legal characterization, and for the unnecessary and 
excessive inflexibility it imposes on the creative exploitation of local resources. 
Having described the existing situation, I feel compelled to note the lack, 
among the competing "solutions" offered, of any that really places a significant 
degree of decision-making or control over future allocations in the hands of those 
most directly affected. Therefore, I will suggest one. 
Instead of approaching the problem as one of establishing a new land 
tenure system from scratch, as indicated by Article 3 of Law 83.127 of June 5, 1983, 
an alternative approach could be to synthesize existing rights into newly created 
ones equally operative in the modern legal system. This would mean, for example, 
recognizing the century-old pastoral right of a group to passage over rural land as 
being legally equal to a modern urban easement across someone else's property to 
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reach one's garage. It would mean recognizing that land is owned in many 
communities as a corporate or joint resource wtih assorted rights accruing to 
various members. It would also mean that alternative arrangements developed in 
different areas would be acceptable unless contrary to an overriding national 
policy or principle (such as the end of slavery or serfdom). 
The difference between this and present practice would not prevent the 
state from altering rights or taking land as it deems appropriate under established 
legal processes and authorities. The difference would be that it would change the 
status of so called "traditional" or "customary" rights from extra-legal phenomena 
that are considered open to selective recognition for incorporation into law as 
technical experts judge appropriate, to enpowerments giving rural peoples and 
communities access to the modern legal system at least equal to that of modern 
urban populations. 
Conclusion 
It would be naive to think that such a precarious balance of opposing 
factors as exist in Mauritania will lend itself in the near future to an easily 
implemented, rational and consistent land reform. However, land reform in 
Mauritania, as in much of the world, is one of the difficult long-term social 
reforms that will have to be effected if meaningful development, let alone dis-
tributive justice, is ever to become generalized. As an interim step, numerous rural 
populations are in immediate need of some institutionalized protection from 
modern economic and political hypotheses that get tested at their expense without 
their consent. One small but totally plausible first step is for the concerned 
technical and political parties to obtain a more profound understanding of both 
their local and generic realities. Another is for analytical studies of such 
situations to be conducted and presented in ways responsive to such needs. A 
third is for the solutions, however interim, to be embodied in actions that not only 
concern themselves with the welfare of the concerned populations, but allow those 
populations a reasonable modicum of control over the determination of their own 
and their communities' lives and futµres. 
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